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The Collateral Source Rule
in Missouri: Questioning the
"Double Recovery" Doctrine
Washington v. Barnes Hospital'
I. INTRODUCTION
The collateral source rule provides that "in an action for compensatory
damages the defendant will not be permitted to establish that the plaintiff did
not actually sustain the amount of injury alleged, if diminution resulted from
the conduct of a third person."2 Missouri courts have consistently refused to
admit evidence of collateral payments received by plaintiffs. Commentators
consistently criticize the rule for providing plaintiffs with the windfall of a
double recovery
In Washington v. Barnes Hospital,4 the Missouri Supreme Court
confronted the issue of the rule's applicability to free public special education
benefits.' The issue had only been addressed by the courts of a few states
and was one of first impression in Missouri.' Adopting the minority position
on the issue, the court abrogated the collateral source rule where the mitigation
evidence offered was of a free governmental benefit, available to all citizens.'
The court's decision marked a clear break with the traditional application
of the rule and may indicate that the court advocates a more serious
questioning of the rationale behind the proposed exclusion before applying the
rule automatically to all mitigation evidence.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Valerie Washington and her son, Corey Washington, brought this medical
malpractice action against Barnes Hospital and two attending physicians,
1. 897 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. 1995).
2. David Fellman, Unreason in the Law ofDamages: The Collateral Source Rule,
77 HARv. L. REV. 741 (1964).
3. See id.
4. 897 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. 1995).
5. Id. at 619.
6. Id. at 620.
7. Id. at 621.
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Dr. Weinstein and Dr. Corteville.' The Washingtons alleged that the doctors
were negligent in failing to promptly diagnose Valerie Washington's placental
abruption9 and to timely perform a caesarean section.'0 Plaintiffs contended
that the negligence directly resulted in permanent brain damage to Corey
Washington, and they sought damages for the injury."
The events essential to the Washingtons' claim occurred on January 30,
1987, between the hours of 4:51 p.m. and 6:25 p.m.. 2 While approximately
32 weeks pregnant with twins, Ms. Washington had experienced abdominal
pain and was transported to the Barnes Hospital Emergency Room by
ambulance. 3 Ms. Washington was then examined by Nurse Spiller, who
observed Ms. Washington's uterus to be rigid. 4 Dr. Weinstein and Dr.
Corteville examined Washington and performed ultrasound and fetal scalp
monitor tests. 5 At that time, the patient was not experiencing any vaginal
bleeding and her uterus was soft. 6 The doctors then observed a dramatic
drop in heart rate for both babies. 17 Dr. Corteville witnessed Corey go
limp" and a caesarian section was immediately ordered and performed. 9
Both babies were successfully delivered.2" Subsequent investigation revealed
that Corey had been deprived of oxygen as a result of a complete placental
abruption.2'
At trial, plaintiffs presented experts who testified that the doctors should
have begun the caesarian section approximately 20 minutes earlier 2 and that
their negligence had caused Corey to suffer permanent brain damage.'
8. Id. at 612.
9. Symptoms of placental abruption include: abnormally intense contractions,
rigidity of the uterus, vaginal bleeding, and signs of fetal distress. Id. at 613.
10. Id. at 613-14.
11. Id. at 614.





17. Id. Corey's heart beat had dropped into the 50's range (120 being normal).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Initially, Valerie Washington refused to consent to the caesarean
procedure; after three minutes she was convinced.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 614 (testimony of Dr. Hummer).
23. Id. at 617 (testimony of Dr. Walter Molofsky).
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Defendants' experts asserted that abruption was not clearly indicated,24 and
that once fetal distress occurred, defendants acted properly.25
Plaintiffs demonstrated that although Corey was five years old, he
operated with the mental capacities of a four-month-old infant, and he would
never be able to sit up or walk independently.26 Plaintiffs' expert, Alan
Spector, explained Corey's future needs resulting from the injury.27 These
included: physical, occupational, and speech therapy; special education at a
private school; weekly nursing visits; a full-time personal attendant; a lifetime
supply of diapers, bedliners and bibs; remodeling of the family home; a van
with a wheelchair lift; and a computer.28  During his testimony, Spector
repeatedly referred to plaintiffs' financial situation.29 The expert testified
that the Washingtons used a stroller to transport Corey because they could not
afford a wheelchair, and they had no automobile, due to insufficient resources.
The expert also revealed that the family had moved into a rental property as
a result of financial constraints.
As early as the pretrial conference, defendants had repeatedly requested
to present mitigation evidence regarding the availability of free public special
education.3' After Spector's testimony, defendants argued that plaintiffs had
"opened the door" to the presentation of evidence regarding public special
education opportunities.32 The trial court refused each request.33
The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis entered judgment against all
defendants in accordance with the jury's verdict.34 The jury awarded
$500,000 for Valerie Washington and $5,000,000 for Corey Washington.35
Pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute § 538.210 (1994), the court reduced the
jury awards of non-economic damages.36 Defendants appealed the judgment
24. Id. at 614. Defendant's experts cited the lack of vaginal bleeding, firm uterus,
signs of fetal distress or complaints of abnormally intense contractions.





30. Id. at 614-15.
31. Id. at 613. A verbal motion in limine was made at the pretrial conference and
denied. Defendants proceeded to file a written motion before the evidence was
presented which was also denied.
32. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 613.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 615.
36. Mo. REv. STAT. § 538.210 (1994) reads in pertinent part, "In any action
against a health care provider for damages for personal injury. . . ,no plaintiff shall
1996]
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to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District." The court of appeals
reversed the circuit court without addressing the collateral source rule issue. 8
Upon transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court,39 defendants challenged
the circuit court's denial of their motions for directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.4" Additionally, they appealed the trial court's
exclusion of evidence regarding the availability of public special education
programs on two separate grounds.4 Defendants argued that this evidence
did not fall within the collateral source rule and that plaintiffs waived their
right to assert the collateral source rule by invoking the issue of financial
need.42
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new
trial on the issue of damages.43 The court held that mitigation evidence of the
free public special education was not barred by the collateral source rule"
and that plaintiffs' expert testimony regarding financial distress permitted
defendants to challenge that need on cross-examination by inquiring about
access to public special education available to plaintiffs.45
recover more than three hundred fifty thousand dollars per occurrence for noneconomic
damages ...." Valerie Washington's non-economic damages were reduced from
$480,000 to $446,000 while Corey Washington's were reduced from $1,209,000 to
$446,000. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 615.
37. Washington v. Barnes Hosp., No. 62364, 1993 WL 478944 (Mo. Ct. App.
Nov. 23, 1993).
38. Washington, 1993 WL 478944, at *1. The court overruled the denial of the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict over the objections of Gaertner, J., dissenting.
39. The Missouri Supreme Court had jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Mo.
CONST. art. V, § 10.
40. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 615. Defendants also appealed the denial of a
continuance during voir dire proceedings until Corey was available to attend. They
asserted that the inability to question potential jurors on the sympathy felt after seeing
Corey was prejudicial. Id. at 622. Additionally, Defendants challenged the sanction
imposed for the failure to supplement prior interrogatory answers. The court denied
the opportunity to present Dr. Corteville's testimony on two recently published articles.
Id Lastly, defendants appealed the verdict as a result of bias, passion and prejudice.
Id. All of these arguments were rejected by the Court. Id.
41. Id. at 619.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 622.








Missouri courts define the collateral source rule as:
a well-established rule in the law of damages, a wrongdoer is not entitled
to have the damages to which he is liable reduced by proving that plaintiff
has received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from
a collateral source, wholly independent of him, or, stated more succinctly,
the wrongdoer may not be benefitted by collateral payments made to the
person he has wronged. 6
The rule is a significant deviation from the general proposition that tort
damages should be compensatory only.47 The collateral source rule "enables
a plaintiff to reap a double recovery in certain circumstances."4 8  This
doctrine has been extensively criticized by commentators49 and has come
under attack in the efforts to reform the tort system. ° Many states have
passed legislation altering the collateral source rule in a variety of
situations.'
In the American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury,52 the Reporters examined several
alternatives to the present application of the collateral source rule; however,
they concluded:
46. Collier v. Roth, 434 S.W.2d 502, 506-07 (Mo. 1968).
47. Overton v. United States, 615 F.2d 1299, 1306 (8th Cir. 1980).
48. Joel K. Jacobsen, The Collateral Source Rule and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR.
L. REV. 523, 528 (1991).
49. See generally David Fellman, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1964); Robert A. Sedler, The
Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury Damages: The Irrelevant Principle and
the Functional Approach (Part 1), 58 KY. L.J. 36 (1970); Charles W. Peckingpaugh,
An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule, 524 INS. L.J. 545 (1966); Lee R. West, The
Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's Windfall, 16 OKLA. L. REV.
395 (1963).
50. See Dana A. Goldsmith, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule: The Effects
of Tort Reform and Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 799, 827-29
(1988); see also id at 809-23 for discussion of legislative attempts to modify the
collateral source rule.
51. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY: REPORTERS' STUDY 161, 166 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-1 (Supp.
1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8553(d)
(Purdon 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.070 (Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18
§ 6862 (1989); FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (Supp. 1990)).
52. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 161.
1996]
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We recommend virtually complete reversal of the collateral source rule
wherever such an approach is feasible. A plaintiff's tort recovery should
be reduced by the amount of present and estimated future payments from
all sources of collateral benefits except life insurance. In tandem with this
reduction in the size of the award payable to the plaintiff, there must be a
bar to any subrogation or reimbursement rights exercised by loss insurers
against the tort award. 3
Commentators who support the rule have offered several policy
rationales.54 Emerging as the most cogent motivation for the rule is the
"benefit of the bargain" rationale. 5  In the case of benefits for which
plaintiff has contracted, courts have held that plaintiff deserves to realize the
"benefit of the bargain" made. 6 In such an instance, plaintiff has paid
consideration for these benefits in the form of premiums, committing
resources which otherwise could have been put to an altogether different
use. 7 One advocate states, "[c]ontract and insurance benefits, being products
of plaintiffs own thrift, foresight, and sacrifice, would clearly seem immune
from mitigation. Indeed allowing plaintiff a partial windfall in these cases
may be viewed as a salutary inducement to insure."58 Even some supporters
of abrogating the rule suggest a two-year premium credit for plaintiffs who
have paid for private insurance benefits that have reduced the amount of their
recovery.59
Another rationale for the rule is to punish the tortfeasor and to assure that
he or she pays for the full impact of the wrongdoing.6" Advocates of this
view believe that if there is to be a windfall, it should go to the innocent
party, not the tortfeasor.6' This justification has been acutely questioned as
53. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 51, at 182.
54. See generally Richard C. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the
American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REV. 669 (1962); Thomas F. Lambert Jr.,
The Case for the Collateral Source Rule, 524 INS. L.J. 531 (1966); Jacobsen, supra
note 48, at 523.
55. See Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66-67 (Ca.
1970); Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. 1960); Goldsmith, supra note 50,
at 800.
56. See supra note 55.
57. See Overton, 619 F.2d at 1306.
58. Lambert, supra note 54, at 544.
59. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 176-77.
60. See Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Loescher, 291 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn.
1980); Roth v. Chatlos, 116 A. 332, 334 (Conn. 1922); Jacobsen, supra note 48, at
528.
61. See Lambert, supra note 54, at 543; Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65
(10th Cir. 1958); Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350
[Vol. 61
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inconsistent with the overall policy of tort recovery to be compensatory and
not punitive. 2
Supporters of the collateral source rule maintain that legal remedies are
insufficient to compensate for plaintiff's injuries. 3 Legal fees and expenses
incurred in seeking relief will come out of any recovery gained.' However,
critics maintain that this is a "backdoor" method of providing additional
compensation. In addition, such method is unavailable to non-tort plaintiffs
and tort plaintiffs not fortunate enough to have benefitted from a collateral
source.
65
Missouri courts have employed the rule in a variety of circumstances."
As the court points out in Washington v. Barnes Hospital, Missouri has
consistently applied the rule to bar mitigation evidence pertaining to insurance
policies held by plaintiffs.67 An often-cited Missouri Supreme Court case,
Kickham v. Carter,68 applies the "benefit of the bargain" rationale and
maintains that defendant should not receive credit from an insurance
agreement that plaintiff had made and for which plaintiff had paid
consideration.69 Iseminger v. Holden" also reinforces this idea declaring
"there would be no logical reason for defendant to receive the benefit...
Employment benefits are another collateral source in Missouri. Courts have
protected these benefits by applying the collateral source doctrine whenever
the employee's work has entitled him or her to benefits.72
U.S. 856 (1954).
62. See Fellman, supra note 49, at 748.
63. See Sedler, supra note 49, at 46, 58.
64. See Hudson, 217 F.2d at 346; Lambert, supra note 54, at 542.
65. See Sedler, supra note 49, at 60; Fellman, supra note 49, at 750.
66. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 619-20.
67. Id. (citing Iseminger v. Holden, 544 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Mo. 1976) (en 'bane)
(finding that plaintiffs did not waive collateral source rule protection when they
admitted an exhibit revealing insurance coverage); Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83,
90 (Mo. 1960) ("[I]nsurance payments received by the plaintiff cannot ordinarily be
set up by the wrongdoer in mitigation of damages."); Protection Sprinkler Co. v. Lou
Chamo Studio, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("When an insured
does not assign its claim, the insured retains title to the action."); Blessing v. Boy
Scouts of America, 608 S.W.2d 484, 488-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("Evidence which
shows that an injured party has received insurance payments is presumed to be
prejudicial. . .To permit such evidence would tend to deny to an injured party
recovery benefits to which he or she would be entitled from some other source.")).
68. 335 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1960).
69. Id. at 90.
70. 544 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
71. Id. at 553.
72. See Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 619-20 (citing Douthet v. State Farm Mut.
19961
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The Missouri Supreme Court has also supported the theory that defendant
should pay for the full impact of his tortious act, no matter how plaintiff
comes out financially." The state of the rule in regard to gratuitous benefits
is less clear.74 Courts in Missouri have split where plaintiff was nursed
gratuitously by a family member.7" Because the protection of plaintiffs
investment is not involved, to prohibit the admission of this evidence, the
court must subscribe to a rationale oriented more toward punishing the
defendant.
76
Missouri courts have applied the rule to block defendants from
introducing mitigation evidence of plaintiffs receipt of public governmental
benefits.77 Until Washington, all of the governmental benefits evaluated had
been dependent on plaintiffs special status or financial need.7"
The collateral source rule implications for free public special education
benefits had only been addressed by four states prior to the decision in
Washington.79 Three of those states concluded that these benefits are subject
to the collateral source rule and cannot be admitted as mitigation evidence by
Auto Ins., 546 S.W.2d 156, 159-60 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)); Leake v. Burlington N. R.
Co., 892 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Mateer v. Union Pac. Sys., 873
S.W.2d 239, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Beck v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 657 S.W.2d
326, 330-31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Siemes v. Englehart, 346 S.W.2d 560, 563-64 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1961).
73. See Collier, 434 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Mo. 1968).
74. See Gibney v. St. Louis Transit Co., 103 S.W. 43, 48 (Mo. 1907) (plaintiff
could not recover for the gratuitous nursing services of her daughter); Morris v. Grand
Ave. Ry. Co., 46 S.W. 170 (Mo. 1898) (court held that plaintiff could not recover for
services for which he did not pay); Kaiser v. St. Louis Transit Co., 84 S.W. 199, 200
(Mo. Ct. App. 1904) (plaintiff recovered for damages after gratuitous nursing by wife
and daughter); Aaron v. Johnston, 794 S.W.2d 724, 726-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(employer's continuation of plaintiffs wages constituted collateral source); see also
West, supra note 49, at 402.
75. See supra note 74.
76. See Kaiser, 84 S.W. at 200.
77. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 620 (citing Cornelius v. Gipe, 625 S.W.2d 880,
882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)); Hood v. Heppler 503 S.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973); Weeks-Maxwell Const. Co. v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 409 S.W.2d 792, 796
(Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
78. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 620.
79. These states included Alabama, Connecticut, North Carolina and Florida.
[Vol. 61
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the defense."0 Only Florida held that evidence of these benefits is admissible
for defendant to prove plaintiff's opportunity to mitigate damages.8'
In Healy v. White, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the
applicability of the rule to public education benefits. 2 The case involved a
seven-year-old plaintiff suffering from brain damage and permanent epilepsy
resulting from a motor vehicle accident with defendant. 3 Plaintiff was
enrolled in public special education provided to him as of right from his
municipality.84  Defendant disputed plaintiffs evidence regarding the
uncertainty of the continuance of the program."5 The court held that the
reliability of the evidence regarding the program's future was irrelevant under
the collateral source rule.86 Citing the traditional majority position,87 the
court held that the collateral source rule applied to free state services, provided
they are truly collateral. 8
Adopting the position of the Healy court, the Alabama Supreme Court
held that the collateral source rule applied to free education opportunities in
Ensor v. Williams.89 In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff sued to
recover damages for injuries from premature birth that resulted in brain
damage and retardation.90 Applying the majority view that the collateral
source rule bars evidence of free government services, the Ensor court held
that defendants were precluded from introducing evidence of plaintiffs
entitlement to free public special education.9' The court emphasized the
uncertainty of the continued existence of the public program and the truly
80. See Williston v. Ard, 611 So. 2d 274, 278 (Ala. 1992); Ensor v. Wilson, 519
So. 2d 1244, 1266-67 (Ala. 1987); Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 736 (N.C. 1987);
Healy v. White, 378 A.2d 540, 546 (Conn. 1977), overruled on other grounds Petriello
v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (1990).
81. Florida Physician's Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514, 515-16 (Fla.
1984).
82. 378 A.2d 540, 545 (Conn. 1977), overruled by Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d
474, 484 (Conn. 1990).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 546.
85. Id. Plaintiff had presented evidence that the program may be discontinued
within his age of minority.
86. Healy, 378 A.2d at 546.
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920(2)A; 22 AM. JUR. 2D,
Damages, 206 ("benefits received by a plaintiff from a source wholly collateral to and
independent of the tortfeasor will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable").
88. Healy, 378 A.2d at 545.
89. 519 So. 2d 1244 (Ala. 1987).
90. Id. at 1246.
91. Id. at 1266-67.
1996]
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collateral nature of the free services.92 Later, applying the Ensor decision in
Williston v. Ard,93 the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's
refusal to permit testimony by defendant's expert as to the public special
education opportunities available to plaintiff.94
North Carolina also adopted the majority position in its leading case,
Cates v. Wilson.9" This medical malpractice action involved defendant's
failure to diagnose the pregnancy of an obese woman.96 As a result of the
alleged negligence, the baby was born with cerebral palsy and mental
retardation.97 The Cates court addressed the applicability of the collateral
source rule to both future Medicaid benefits and free public special education
benefits.98 The court set forth three primary justifications for affording these
benefits the protection of the collateral source rule."
The Cates court's first explanation illustrated the right of plaintiffs not
to be forced to depend on public charity and recognized plaintiffs' right to
prefer private care."° Next, subscribing to the view of the other majority
courts, the court relied on grounds accentuating the instability of the public
programs and their dependence on legislative approval.'' The court
recognized that there may very likely be a termination of these benefits in an
effort to balance the budget."° The court's third basis for denying the
admission of these benefits into evidence was the cognizance that the benefits
were dependent upon continued indigency and that even a small damage award
would disqualify them from the protection of the program.'0 3 This pretense
does not apply to public education, however, which is free to all persons as
92. Id.
93. 611 So. 2d 274 (Ala. 1992).
94. Id. at 278.
95. 361 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. 1987).
96. Id. at 736.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 737. The court also analyzed the collateral source issues presented by
past Medicaid payments and gratuitous home services. On the past Medicaid benefits
issue, the court applied the collateral sources for two reasons. First, it is the equivalent
of health insurance and should be treated as such for collateral source purposes.
Secondly, in North Carolina, Medicaid is equipped with a right of subrogation and can
recover from the plaintiff the result of any judgment. Id. at 737-78.
99. Id. at 738-39.
100. Id. at 738.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 739. The court emphasized the lack of wisdom in placing plaintiff's
future in the hands of uncertain government programs. It likens this to the "foolish
house builder in the parable, to rebuild lives on shifting sands. The floods may come,
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a matter of right.' In summation, the Cates court stated "... as between
defendants who tortiously inflict injury and innocent taxpayers who fund
programs such as Medicaid, we think it better that the loss fall on the
tortfeasor."°s
The Cates court indicated in dicta that perhaps the evidence would have
been admissible if plaintiffs had "opened the door" to financial need. 06
Despite the fact that defendants won on the issue of liability, the Cates court
highlighted the significance of erroneously admitting evidence barred by the
collateral source rule. The court noted that such an error most likely had a
substantial prejudicial affect on plaintiffs, making them appear as though
trying to attain a double recovery. 0 7
The minority position was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in
Florida Physician's Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley. ° In this case, like
Washington v. Barnes Hospital, the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of a
failure to diagnose oxygen deprivation just before birth."° The Stanley
court determined that the collateral source rule will protect only those benefits
earned by the plaintiff."' Quoting an Illinois case, Peterson v. Lou
Bachrodt Chevrolet Corporation,"' the court rejected the notion that the
collateral source rule should be applied to punish defendants."' It asserted
that an unjustified windfall to the plaintiff "borders too closely on approval of
11113unwarranted punitive damages...
Further explaining its position, the Stanley court stressed that the
inapplicability of the collateral source rule here does not bar plaintiff from
presenting additional evidence on the inadequacy of the public benefits and the
lack of certainty of their continued availability."'
104. Id. at 737.
105. Id. at 739.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 740.
108. 452 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1984).
109. Id. at 515.
110. Id. at 515-16.
111. 392 N.E.2d 1 (Il. 1979). This issue in Peterson was whether plaintiff could
recover for free medical services already obtained at a charitable hospital. The court
held "[t]o permit mitigation does not deprive the plaintiff of all benefit, since he did
have the services when he needed them and without cost. Awarding him the monetary
value of the services in a judgment probably rendered several years later seems an
unanticipated windfall." Id. at 5 (citing David Fellman, Unreason in the Law of
Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741, 752 (1964)).
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The dissent in Stanley"' asserted that the majority's reliance on the
Peterson case was misplaced. 16  The dissent distinguished charitable
assistance previously received and future care dependent on public
welfare."' Believing the majority had "transfer[ed] the responsibility for the
tort from the tortfeasor, where it legally and morally belongs, to the victim
and the community,""'s the dissent expressed disdain with the concept of
forcing the plaintiff to depend on public welfare." 9
In this context, the Missouri Supreme Court examined the applicability
of the collateral source rule to education as a matter of right that is free to all
regardless of wealth or status. Washington v. Barnes Hospital,20 a medical
malpractice case, first presented the issue to the court.'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Washington v. Barnes Hospital,"z the court first addressed the denial
of defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The
court noted the strength of defendants' case on the negligence issue, 124 but
nevertheless determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict in favor of plaintiffs.' 5
The court then addressed the issue of whether the mitigation evidence of
free public school education should have been admitted at trial. 26 In its
approach to the collateral source rule issue, the court noted the difficulty of
confining the rule to one broad definition. The court determined that it "is not
a single rule but rather, a combination of rationales applied to a number of
different circumstances to determine whether evidence of mitigation of
damages should be precluded from admission."'127
The court then explored the various justifications that have been used by
several courts for applying the rule. 28 In its analysis, the court recognized
115. 452 So. 2d 514, 516 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 516-17.
118. Id. at 517.
119. Id.
120. 897 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. 1995).
121. Id. at 620.
122. Id. at 611. Judge Price wrote the unanimous opinion for the court.
123. Id. at 615.
124. Id. at 618.
125. Id.
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the following rationales: entitlement to the benefit of plaintiffs bargain;
punishment of the tortfeasor; windfalls created should go to the plaintiff;
inadequacy of public benefits and uncertainty of their future availability;
gratuities were intended for plaintiff, not defendant; compensation of plaintiff
for legal fees and expenses; and, avoidance of prejudicing plaintiff in minds
of the jury.'29
After enumerating the various rationales, the court explored the general
use of the collateral source rule in Missouri. 30 In light of the facts in the
instant case, the court focused more narrowly on the rule's application to
governmental benefits.' In examining Missouri's previous use of the
collateral source rule in cases involving Medicaid and Medicare benefits,
social security and veteran's benefits, the court classified these benefits as
"contingent upon plaintiffs financial need or special status" or "at least
partially contingent upon plaintiffs former service or payments."'32
Consequently, the court recognized the split in Missouri authority on whether
or not the collateral source rule should apply to bar evidence of gratuitous
services received by the plaintiffs.'
Recognizing the issue as one of first impression, the court looked to the
decisions of four other states which had previously addressed the specific
application of the collateral source rule to evidence of free public special
education.'34 The court first explored the reasoning of the majority, which
had determined that education benefits, like other government benefits, are
subject to the collateral source rule and that they are inadmissible.'35 It
characterized the analysis of these courts in deciding the issue.'36 The court
stated that the majority courts contemplated whether the free public special
education was "truly independent" of plaintiff and upon determining it was,
the courts mechanically applied the collateral source rule and barred evidence
of the educational programs.'37 The Washington court identified additional
rationales of the majority courts including the lack of certainty of the
continued availability of the public benefits and the fact that some of these
benefits require a plaintiff's continued troubled financial status.'
129. Id.
130. Id. at 619-20.
131. Id. at 620.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. See also Williston, 611 So. 2d at 278; Ensor, 519 So. 2d at 1266; Healy,
378 A.2d at 545; Cates, 361 S.E.2d at 736; and Stanley, 452 So. 2d at 515.
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In exploring the minority approach as applied in Florida, the court cited
the decision in Florida Physician's Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley. 39 The
Washington court quoted from a passage in Stanley asserting that the collateral
source rule does not apply in the context of public special education. 40 The
Stanley court determined that "the policy behind the collateral source rule
simply is not applicable if the plaintiff has incurred no expense, obligation, or
liability in obtaining the services for which he seeks compensation."'' The
court explained that the Stanley court upholds the justification of the collateral
source rule's applicability in situations where a tortfeasor stands to benefit
from expenditures made by the injured party in incurring an insurance
policy.'42 The court then noted that the Florida Supreme Court went on to
reject the view that the collateral source rule should be applied solely to insure
a detriment to defendant.
1 43
The Washington court agreed with the rationale articulated in the Stanley
decision.' 44 The court explained that none of the valid justifications for
applying the collateral source rule were present in the instant case. 45 The
court emphasized that educational benefits are available to everyone regardless
of special status. 46  The court conceded the fact that plaintiff had
contributed tax dollars to this fund but maintained that the defendant had
contributed to the revenue fund as well. Therefore, no undue windfall results
for either. 47
The court concluded that the collateral source rule should not be utilized
for the sole purpose of impacting the defendants and insisted that damages in
Missouri's tort system are compensatory rather than punitive.' 48 The court
further justified its decision in noting that on remand plaintiffs would have the
opportunity to challenge the adequacy and continued availability of the free
public special education programs available.
49
In addition to holding that the evidence of free public special education
was not subject to the collateral source rule, the court provided another
139. 452 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1984).
140. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 620-21.
141. Stanley, 452 So. 2d at 515 (quoting Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.,
392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (111. 1979)).
142. Id. at 515-16.
143. Id at 516.
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justification for reversal on the issue of damages. 50 Defendants had argued
that the testimony of plaintiffs' expert, Alan Spector, "opened the door" to the
issue of alternatives to expensive private education.' Spector testified
regarding Corey Washington's future needs as a result of the injury.'52 As
to whether Spector's repeated references to the Washingtons' financial
need' justified cross-examination as to opportunities for free public special
education, the court applied a fairly recent decision, Moore v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company.'54 The court noted that in Moore, plaintiff described his
inability to afford continuation of therapy for his injury during direct
examination.' The Washington court also recognized the Moore court's
holding that "there is an exception to the general collateral source rule of
inadmissibility where a plaintiff voluntarily injects his financial
condition."'56 Regardless of the plaintiffs intent, it was improper for the
trial court to deny the defendant the right to cross-examine as to collateral
benefits received. 7 Although the standard of review for issues involving
the scope of cross-examination is abuse of discretion,'58 the Washington
court held that the trial court's failure to permit defendants to admit mitigation
evidence after Spector's repeated references to the financial status of the
plaintiffs was such an abuse.'59
The court affirmed the judgment as to liability. However, the court
reversed and remanded on the issue of damages 60 holding that evidence of
free public special education does not fall within the collateral source rule.'
V. COMMENT
Determining the correct scope of the collateral source rule is difficult and
vigorously disputed. With the expanding influence of governmental benefits,
it is difficult to determine what role these benefits should play in tort
recovery. In the face of extensive criticisms of the outrageous recoveries in
tort law, it has become increasingly difficult to justify the collateral source
150. Id.
151. Id. at 619.
152. Id. at 614.
153. See id. at 614-15.
154. 825 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
155. Id. at 841-42.
156. Id. at 842-43.
157. Id. at 843.
158. Id.
159. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 622.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 621.
1996]
15
Becker: Becker: Collateral Source Rule in Missouri:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
rule and the "double recovery" it invariably produces. 62 In Washington v.
Barnes Hospital,63 the court successfully avoided awarding the plaintiff
with a windfall, yet failed to address the additional burden that educating
Corey Washington will place on state taxpayers.
To avoid the unfairness of shifting the costs of Corey's injury onto
Missouri taxpayers, Missouri should be permitted to recover the additional
costs of educating Corey. Allowing collateral sources to collect would ensure
full payment of the harm caused, without overcompensating plaintiffs.
The Missouri Supreme Court adopted a minority view in its decision in
Washington on an issue addressed by very few states.'" In the limited
situation where a public benefit is available to all regardless of status, the
court refused to use the collateral source doctrine to keep the information from
the jury. 6 It implicitly decided that juries are capable of hearing evidence
regarding the collateral source and determining whether it provided adequate
compensation, or whether additional damages are necessary to fully
compensate for the harm caused.
The majority position justifies the exclusion of such evidence through a
fairly rigid application of the rule." The Washington court here rejected
"blind adherence"' 67 to the collateral source rule and factually distinguished
education benefits from those deserving the rule's protection.'68
Additionally, its ruling emphasized that plaintiffs would have an opportunity
to present the inadequacies of the public benefits and the lack of certainty of
their continued existence. 69 This will allow the finder of fact to have all
the information necessary to weigh the evidence and correctly determine the
adequacy of the public program and the needs of the injured party. 7 '
The decision in Washington will not apply in the vast majority of
collateral source issues because it is distinguishable based on the unique
benefit it addresses. The distinctive nature of free education makes it unlikely
162. See Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 802.
163. 897 S.W. 611 (Mo. 1995).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (2)A (1979).
165. See Jacobsen, supra note 48, at 541 ("Courts should not stretch the [collateral
source] rule so as to interfere with the jury's calculation of damages in situations not
involving the exchange of consideration, such as the provision of governmental
benefits").
166. See Stanley, 452 So. 2d at 516 (calling the application a "blind adherence").
167. Id.
168. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 621.
169. Id.
170. See Jacobsen, supra note 48, at 525 (when relevant information on the issue
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that Missouri courts will drastically change the application of the rule to other
collateral source benefits.
In its examination of the use of the rule, the Missouri Supreme Court
acknowledged cases involving governmental benefits like social security,
welfare or veteran's benefits which depend upon plaintiff's wealth or special
status.'' Social security and veteran's benefits are funds into which
plaintiffs have usually contributed in one form or another. In the case of
welfare benefits, it is more difficult to justify the benefit of the bargain
rationale. All taxpayers contribute to these funds, and they are available to all
who qualify. The concern with excluding welfare benefits from collateral
source rule protection may stem from the fact that any judgment made in
favor of the plaintiff, no matter how small, may disqualify him or her from
future welfare benefits. With each of these governmental benefits that
Missouri courts have addressed, the fact that they are dependent upon some
unique characteristic of the plaintiff usually justifies collateral source rule
application.
Where the decision may have its greatest influence is on the applicability
of the rule to gratuitous benefits. The Washington court recognized the split
of authority among Missouri appellate courts in this area.'72 The court
strongly advocated use of the "benefit of the bargain" rationale in analyzing
the implications of collateral sources. In siding with the minority, Missouri
agreed with Florida, a state which has already modified the common-law
collateral source rule by statute.'73 In quoting the Stanley court, the
Washington court apparently subscribed to the view that where the "injured
party incurs no expense, obligation or liability, we see no justification for
applying the [collateral source] rule." This would seem to indicate that
plaintiff should not recover for gratuitous nursing services provided for family
and friends. However, later in the opinion, when distinguishing the instant
case from cases where use of the collateral source rule would be valid, the
Washington court appeared to protect these gratuitous benefits. The court
stated, "[n]or are these benefits provided as a gift by a friend or family
member to assist plaintiffs specifically, such that it would be inequitable to
transfer the value of the benefit from the plaintiffs to defendants."' 74
171. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 620.
172. See supra note 63.
173. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 1995) ("In any action ... in which
damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court shall
reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for
the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to him, from all collateral
sources; however, there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a
subrogation or reimbursement right exists . .
174. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 621.
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It is unclear how the court would rule in a purely gratuitous service case.
In examining the issue more squarely from the "benefit of the bargain"
perspective, the court may be hesitant to permit a double recovery in the case
of gratuitous benefits. Recovery in those instances would permit plaintiff to
recover for losses not actually sustained. However, the Washington court
emphasized that gratuities are intended to benefit the plaintiff, not to lessen the
defendant's liability. The windfall problem in this instance could be
substantially averted by creating a right of subrogation in the person
administering the gratuitous services.
In the present case, the court did not address the fact that, although
defendant may benefit from the admission into evidence of the existence of
these programs, the cost will be borne by the public. Problems with the
collateral source rule could be greatly lessened with wider subscription to
subrogation rights for the collateral sources themselves.'
Here, it is inequitable that the taxpayer must take on the additional cost
of educating a child with demanding special needs. This is especially true
when the cost of educating Corey Washington would have been significantly
lessened had he not been injured by the negligent defendant. If defendant
were accountable to taxpayers for these expenses, the courts could avoid the
"windfall" situation altogether.
Expanding the right of subrogation is not the perfect solution. Although
theoretically increased subrogation rights are a good idea in practicality, they
are not very effective. The American Law Institute Reporters' Study points
to difficulties with the expansion of subrogation.'76 They note "the daunting
task of developing procedures for effectively implementing subrogation and
reimbursement of collateral sources."'77 In order for subrogation rights to
work effectively several procedures would have to be solidified. The
Reporters stress the necessity of: notice provisions to collateral sources,
formulas for allocating settlements and recoveries between plaintiff, attorney
and collateral source, and methods for preventing fraud on collateral sources
in the allocation of settlements. Unless the above complex and specific
procedures are implemented, collateral sources may not have notice of the
litigation, or receive their fair share of plaintiffs recovery. The complexity
of the proposed changes may make this method too impractical for
implementation.
The Missouri legislature should follow the lead of other states"' and
abrogate the rule's application to free public education benefits in addition to
175. See West, supra note 49, at 414. ("Why not allow the person who provided
the collateral source benefits to be reimbursed to the extent of his expenditures?")
176. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 179.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 51.
[Vol. 61
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eliminating subrogation rights in compliance with the recommendations of the
American Law Institute. 79 However, until the rule is changed through
legislation, increased execution of subrogation rights remains the best
alternative. Despite possible problems, a wider application of subrogation
rights is dictated to prevent the rising cost of health care and governmental
benefits. Properly exercised, defendant would not escape paying full
compensatory damages for the harm caused by his or her tortious behavior,
nor would plaintiff be unjustly enriched. 8 Those parties who contributed
to the compensation of plaintiffs whether they be employers, family, or the
government, should be entitled to reimbursement by the defendant responsible
for the injury. This system would relax strain on these "collateral sources,"
yet not subject defendant to pay unwarranted damages.
The Washington court does not address the additional burden on
taxpayers that educating a child with Corey Washington's special needs will
have. While avoiding a windfall to plaintiff, the Missouri court has placed a
substantial burden on the government.
VI. CONCLUSION
Washington v. Barnes Hospital18 1 is a first step for the Missouri
Supreme Court in examining the collateral source rule more closely, and
putting a new faith in the jury's ability to determine the adequacy of collateral
recovery. In its support of the "benefit of the bargain" rationale, the court
may be entering a phase questioning the rule's application in cases involving
purely gratuitous benefits or unearned governmental entitlements that do not
rely on plaintiff's unique, specific characteristics.
While avoiding a windfall to the Washingtons in this case, the court
placed an undue burden on Missouri taxpayers. The defendants in this case
will not be paying for the additional costs of educating Corey, which resulted
from his injuries. Is avoiding a windfall to the Washingtons and apportioning
the costs of defendants' negligence on the public really a superior outcome to
having defendants fully compensate plaintiffs for the injury?
179. AMERICAN LAW INsTrrUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 182.
However, it should be noted that a statutory abrogation of the collateral source rule
may face equal protection and due process challenges based on federal and state
constitutions. See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1995); see also
Faye L. Ferguson, Note, Equal Protection Challenges to Legislative Abrogation of the
Collateral Source Rule, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303 (1987) and Craig L. Farrish,
Restoration of the Collateral Source Rule in Kentucky: A Review of O'Bryan v.
Hedgespeth, 23 N. KY. L. REv. 357 (1996).
180. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 182.
181. 897 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. 1995).
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The Washington decision will hopefully encourage courts to ensure that
there is a sound justification for withholding relevant information regarding
collateral source payments from the jury. Courts in the future will not be able
to simply apply the rule as a matter of habit without somehow rationalizing
the exclusion of pertinent evidence.
TIFFANY GULLEY BECKER
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